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I intend to investigate established theoretical and 
embodied accounts of identities excluded within Western 
heteronormative society in order to seek out how those 
embodiments and theories may parallel what I contend is 
another impossible subject position — the child male 
victim of adult female sexual violence. The first chapter 
lays out the mise-en-scene of underlying assumptions of the 
study and how those assumptions help carve the discursive 
space I seek.
In the second chapter I examine how Judith Butler and 
Gloria Anzaldua have elucidated and embodied the excluded 
possibilities inherent in compulsory heterosexuality and 
along the way ask: to what extent do those theoretical 
positions help illuminate the subject position, 
subjectivity and subjection of "male victim of female 
sexual violence?" I will explore how these examples may 
mark out a space, even if that body is constructed by its 
absence, or by what is not said about it.
This brings up uncomfortable questions: Are not there 
bodies that cannot, by definition, be queer? What right do 
those bodies have to attempt to appropriate queer? How can 
this body (male victim of female) even exist? In light of 
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the first two questions, I purposefully stop short of any 
claim to queer the body in question. I contend that it is 
the reasonableness of the last question that provides the 
impetus for the project -- the impossibility of the body 
calls for the search.
The third chapter examines to what extent one film, 
Lousi Malle's Murmur of the Heart, represents the 
exigencies of compulsory heterosexuality.
iv
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CHAPTER ONE
IS THERE A MALE VICTIM?
The Invisible Man
In early 2008, I presented an abbreviated version of 
this paper at a conference panel entitled "Trauma and 
Performance." In the paper I briefly suggest that the sex 
act between mother and son in Louis Malle's film Murmur of 
the Heart demonstrates that heterosexual society's need for 
boys to become men -- by performing the heterosexual act of 
coitus -- outweighs the traumatic abuse of power that the 
act represents.
The moderator asked me how I knew there was trauma; in 
other words, how did I know that the boy in the film was 
traumatized? What if he did not experience the event as 
trauma? -Indeed, the film implies that that the boy is 
released from problems that 'have plagued him throughout the 
film by the event.1 My difficulty in answering the question 
pointed out the exact issue that lies at the root of the 
phenomenon I had set out to investigate. The moderator, in 
my view, interpreted my assertion as a simple endorsement 
of the primary prohibition of incest.
1
Gender studies has pushed to understand how social 
construction of certain physical acts as, variously, 
foolish, deviant, and/or dangerous controls the erotic. 
This led many, including me, to question whether all sexual 
practices are always (already) controlled by discursively 
produced norms, and therefore to question those norms, 
which include the primary prohibition of incest. The 
moderator's question falls in this general area of concern, 
but also enacts the production of one of the norms I seek 
to investigate - the dissonance between prohibition of sex 
between adults and children and the older woman ushering a 
young boy into sexuality fantasy that recurs in Western 
cinema and reinforces the view of the moderator.
There are several questions at play here. One concerns 
the notion of sex as an exercise of power; specific sexual 
practices may be enacted consensually or non-consensually. 
Sex, in this scenario, is only one possible means by which 
a person may wield power. Does consent not nullify that 
exercise of power?
The first question leads, necessarily, to others: can 
consent (like human rights) be subverted by social 
construction? Could a person in a lower position of power 
dismiss or deny his/her access to consent via Foucaultian ' 
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self-regulation? How might such scenarios render the 
subversion of consent invisible?
Identity Formation
Much of the early theoretical work of gender studies 
and other post-structural/postmodern identity studies 
cataloged the ways in which discourse produces, normalizes, 
controls, and enforces available identity categories. This 
work started with feminism's search for women missing 
(literally) in/from the canon and expanded to the search 
for what it means to be different. Philosophers, critics 
and radical thinkers have outlined ways in which 
heteronormative society produces the cultural, sexual, and 
social categories it seeks to inscribe.
This work was necessarily disembodied; it radically 
reconsidered identity categories - by examining what 
identities are available, to whom they are available, under 
what conditions they come into being, and what material 
conditions are produced as a consequence. The study had to 
exclude, almost by intent, the specific experiences of 
specific bodies.
Some theorists (identified as queer) recognized this 
disjuncture between identity categories and the experiences 
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of the bodies that are said to occupy them. Although 
referring primarily to race, Teresa de Lauretis notes that, 
"A gay Chicano writer cannot identify with the white middle 
class gay community of the Castro... [and a] Chicana lesbian 
might well choose to make her community with Native 
American women rather than with lesbians period"
("Introduction" ix). Consequently, it seems likely that the 
"category mistakes" (Butler, "Imitation" 309) that de 
Lauretis asserts would apply not only to those bodies 
constructed in subordinate identities, but also to 
ostensibly charmed or favored bodies. In other words, it 
might be just as likely that the identity category of white 
heterosexual man or woman may fail to account for the 
experience of a specific man or woman constructed into that 
category.
This possibility, however, is fraught with difficulty.
This theoretical dismantling of the idea of stable identity 
categories appears to erase difference - after all, if 
identity is constructed, is not everyone the same 
underneath? The fact that category mistakes may occur in 
superordinate identity categories is troublesome, 
especially if these mistakes can be said to be an iteration 
of queer. People do not have the power in and of themselves 
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to change material conditions, and certain identities are 
constituted with lesser social value. In fact, as de 
Lauretis demonstrates in a quotation from Audre Lorde's 
Zami (about two lesbians of different race), differences in 
material conditions are experiences that may well override 
identity: "Muriel seemed to believe we were...all equal in 
our outsiderhood...It was wishful thinking based on little 
fact; the ways in which it was true languished in the 
shadow of those many ways in which it would always be 
false" (qtd in de Lauretis, "Introduction" x). This 
scenario -- in which the experiences of bodies that might, 
through the eyes of a heteronormative culture, seem the 
same but actually diverge — presents a conundrum with 
political consequences. Some theorists/activists have 
chosen to address this problem by setting queer aside and 
reclaiming identity categories for necessary political 
purposes. It almost seems that a balkanization of identity 
categories must occur to effect change.
Further, as Judith Butler notes, "That any 
consolidation of identity requires some set of 
differentiations and exclusions seems clear...If the 
rendering visible of lesbian/gay identity now presupposes a 
set of exclusions, then perhaps part of what is necessarily 
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excluded is the future uses of the sign" ("Imitation" 311). 
The consolidation she considers has as its goal the radical 
re-appropriation of the category. This political goal may 
indeed provide a site for the survival of specific bodies 
constructed into those categories, but it also tends to 
perpetuate differences and solidify the (apparent) need to 
choose identity categories. As Foucault demonstrates, these 
categories are already sustained by church, state, legal, 
educational and other insidiously immovable systems.
Importantly, these practical moves — away from stable 
identity, then toward claimed identity — did not provide, 
could not provide for anybody that might not fit exactly 
into a category or that might cross, straddle, or exist 
between categories, unless that body could/would claim a 
single identity. However, theoretically at least, it seems 
queer theory could do those things.
De Lauretis ends her piece with a hopeful question: 
could queer theory "construct another discursive horizon, 
another way of living the racial and the sexual?" 
("Introduction" xi). while it may or may not be able to 
counteract the violent homophobia that plagues Western 
culture, if queer theory can continue to provide a way to 
embody the myriad ways compulsory heterosexuality fails to 
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bring voice to the experiences of all the bodies that do 
not fit, radical change may yet occur.
Male Masculinity
In this section and the next I examine two discursive 
productions related to identity: normative "male 
masculinity" and its exigencies; and the "victim of sexual 
violence," especially "male'victim." I will argue that 
production of the former sets up a structure in which the 
latter only exists as a nonconsensual act between gendered 
males.
David Halperin, following Michel Foucault, asserts 
that "the individuating function .of sexuality, its role in 
generating sexual identities" ("Is" 420) is a product of 
the nineteenth century. In the sexual practices of free 
Greek males, there was a "more generalized ethos of 
penetration and domination...structured by the presence or 
absence of ...the phallus" (421). Further, the protocols for 
how this penetration/domination equation overrode 
(indicated) gender are present as well. The concern of 
Greek society was "the male desire to be penetrated by 
males, for such a desire represent[ed] a voluntary 
abandonment of the culturally constructed masculine 
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identity in favor of the culturally constructed feminine 
one" (422). According to Halperin, domination is masculine 
and can be performed solely by the penetrator. Males who 
are dominated are consequently not masculine.
Halperin demonstrates the same discursive production
>
in Jack Abbott's society (juvenile detention and prison); 
"the division of the society into superordinate and 
subordinate groups" (425) falls along constructed gender 
lines, and the only available identification for 
subordinate is (male) femininity. Male masculinity is the 
sole province of the superordinate group.
Tomas Almaguer extends this understanding of the 
production of male masculinity/femininity to the 
Mexican/Latin American sexual system. Using examples of 
male homosexual practices in Nicaragua, Mexico, and the 
U.S., Almaguer notes how gender-associated masculine and 
feminine roles trump fixed sexual identity. Penetration is 
active and masculine, while "[t]he stigma conferred to the 
passive role is fundamentally inscribed in gender-coded 
terms" ("Chicano" 258). The implication is clear: male 
femininity produces a "passive agent [who] is an abject, 
degraded being" (259). Put another way, if the male is not 
masculine (read "penetrating"), his existence as a male is 
in question. In terms of "object choice," masculinity is a 
moving target.
Gendered Norms
The fear of our desires keeps them suspect and 
indiscriminately powerful, for to suppress any 
truth is to give it strength beyond endurance. 
The fear that we cannot grow beyond whatever 
distortions we may find within ourselves keeps us 
docile and loyal and obedient, externally 
defined, and leads us to accept many facets of 
our oppression as women.
- Audre Lorde, "The Uses of the Erotic"
Gender coding within heteronormativity limits 
available subject positions for everyone. De Lauretis 
concludes, after a consideration of the function of 
castration in identity formation, "[h]aving nothing to 
lose, in^other words, women cannot desire; having no 
phallic capital to invest or speculate on, as men do, women 
cannot be investors in the marketplace of desire but are 
instead commodities that circulate in it" ("Lure" 217). 
Compulsory heterosexuality does not/cannot produce a female 
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who is not a commodity, that is, the subject "active woman" 
(in the sexual sense) cannot exist.
Further, de Lauretis, demonstrating that the "most 
common" "object/sign of lesbian desire...in modern Western 
cultures...is some form of what is coded as masculinity" 
(243), writes that this is because
not only is masculinity associated with sexual 
activity and desire, imaged in the erect penis 
and its symbolic or ritual representation in the 
phallus; but...in a cultural tradition pervasively 
homophobic, masculinity alone carries a strong 
connotation of sexual desire for the female body. 
(243)
This passage, while it asserts grounds for lesbian desire, 
inscribes the normative grounds by which masculine (read 
"real") males are produced. It connotes males' desire for 
the female body and suggests that access to the female body 
must be' (or have been) desired. Since activity codes 
masculinity, a sort of reverse logic works to re-figure all 
activity as having come from the male, whether it does or 
not.
Butler puts the interconnectedness of gender coding 
and excluded sexual possibilities this way, "both gender 
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presentation and sexual practices may corollate such that 
it appears that the former 'expresses' the latter, and yet 
both are jointly constituted by the very sexual 
possibilities that they exclude" ("Imitation" 315). This 
should be as true for the male coded as masculine as it is 
true for the masculine female coded masculine and/or 
feminine coded male; that is, the excluded sexual 
possibilities should form the subject position. In the body 
I seek, the disjuncture occurs at the very point that the 
excluded sexual possibility forms the abject subject 
position (victim of female sexual abuse) from male coded 
masculine.
The imperative of male masculinity may be most 
forcefully expressed in normative heterosexual relations. 
One of the necessary elements in the construction of a male 
masculinity is its dependence on its binary opposite "not 
male/masculine." Heterocentricity requires this function of 
women and enforces it through compulsory heterosexuality, a 
term first used by Adrienne Rich.
The Sexual Victim
Adrienne Rich's "Compulsory Heterosexuality" forms the 
base of what critics understand about the effects of 
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normative heterosexuality on those constructed under it. In 
one section of this important work, Rich looks at research 
by Kathleen Barry in order to examine the set of conditions 
through which sexual violence flourishes. Rich lays out the 
complicit role heteronormativity plays in the conditioning 
of the female victim of sexual slavery, and of the male 
procurer who manipulates her with friendship and love: "The 
ideology of heterosexual romance, beamed at her from 
childhood out of fairy tales, television, films, 
advertising, popular songs, wedding pageantry, is a tool 
ready to the procurer's hand and on which he does not 
hesitate to use" (Rich 237)" A bit of deconstructive work 
uncovers the corollary effect of that same normative 
indoctrination on males. If this ideology, beamed to both 
males and females alike, establishes the conditions by 
which gendered females can be subjected to sexual violence 
(become victims), then it must simultaneously produce the 
non-condition in the male, which is not "victimizer," but 
rather "not victim." Society imbues the normative male with 
the impossibility of victimhood as powerfully as it imbue 
the gendered female with the possibility of victimhood.
Among other examples, Rich catalogs (and elaborates) 
Kathleen Gough's "characteristics- of male power" (qtd in 
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"Compulsory" 233) and many of the characteristics associate 
to physical dominance: there is the power "to confine," "to 
cramp," and "to command" (233). At least one of the 
characteristics specifically denotes penetration: "to force 
[male sexuality] upon them" (233). Compulsory 
heterosexuality equates male/masculine with 
dominance/penetration.
The final characteristic elaborated by Rich is the 
"'Great Silence' regarding women and particularly lesbian 
existence" (233). This erasure, which Rich challenges, 
represents the implied impossibility — within 
heterocentricity — of gendered females to perform sexual 
acts without a gendered male. Since two females alone would 
be unable (ostensibly) to penetrate or be penetrated, sex 
cannot exist. In a sexual interaction between a gendered 
male and female, then, compulsory heterosexuality provides 
one possible subject position for the male, 
masculine/dominant.
One of the assertions incorrectly attributed to Rich 
was that she equated penetrative sex with rape. She
k
disavows the connection in the Afterward to "Compulsory..., ' 
but the relative ease with which penetration connects to 
sexual violence may be productive in understanding how
13
sexual violence is constructed. To what extent does sexual 
violence rely upon an act of penetration — threatened or 
actual?
In the same way that lesbian sexual interaction can be 
said not to exist due to the lack of penetration, the 
absence of the threat (act) of penetration in a 
nonconsensual sexual act with a male initiated by a female 
indicates that there can be no victim in the same way that 
there was no sex in the former. The idea of a woman raping 
a man is incoherent within heteronormative gender coding.
The construction of masculinity/femininity, as 
outlined by Rich, Halperin, and Almaguer, suggests that 
domination occurs via penetration. More importantly, 
domination — and its byproduct, masculinity -- cannot be 
produced without penetration.
Rich aptly observes, with regard to the sexual 
oppression of women by men, that "[n]ever is it asked 
whether, under the conditions of male supremacy, the notion 
of 'consent' has any meaning" (235). Similarly, male 
supremacy forecloses the possibility of an act of violence 
(or sexuality) with a female agent in exactly the same 
manner. Rephrasing just slightly, never is it (can it be) 
asked whether, under the conditions of male supremacy, the 
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notion of consent (given by male child to an adult woman) 
has (can have) any meaning.
The Myth of Affirmative Consent
Consent is a trope in Western democracy. In the trope, 
individuals freely give or withhold consent, and consent is 
difficult to subvert and durable. As Jonathan Brody 
Kramnick suggests, the absence of consent in "modern 
democracy or sexuality...would be an injustice or a crime, a 
violation of deeply held ideas of political rights and 
personal autonomy" (453) . If we examine those expectations 
of rights and autonomy, though, something very different 
emerges. Kramnick notes that "[b]oth present a root 
paradox: consent dwells in the mind, and can only be 
inferred in practice; it is at once elemental to legitimacy 
and autonomy and beguilingly inaccessible" (453). The 
social theory that underpins modern democracy addresses 
this inaccessibility explicitly, though; consent is 
generally assumed rather than obtained, and silence 
indicates its presence. For seventeenth century theorist 
John Locke, a concept as basic as "political legitimacy" 
rests on the "notion of unspoken and implied consent"
15
(456). Citizens do not, then, affirm their consent to be 
governed. The trope appears to be a myth.
Locke writes that "every Man, that hath any 
Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of 
any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is 
as far forth obliged to Obedience to the laws of that 
government" (qtd in Kramnick 456). If one lives in a 
democratic society, then, one consents to its laws. This 
foundational principle of democracy — that silence equals 
consent — moves almost seamlessly from the civic to the 
sexual.
Carole Pateman, in The Sexual Contract, argues 
extensively that the "patriarchal right extends throughout 
civil society" (4) and thus imbues sexual contracts (such 
as, but not limited to, marriage) with the same qualities 
that the social contracts of Locke, Hobbes, and Rousseau 
do. So individuals consent to sexual relations in exactly 
the same way - - implicitly. Conversation analyses of rape 
trials demonstrate that, in fact, women must signal non­
consent forcefully or the courts may consider them 
deficient in their refusal of sex (Kitzinger and Frith, 
Ehrlich). Looking at sexual abuse cases, discourse analyst 
Clare MacMartin notes that "the implausibility of a 
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complaint of sexual abuse is tied to a different aspect of 
a child's capacity to give consent - not to sexual abuse, 
but to ongoing and repeated social contact with a familiar, 
or even familial, accused" (14). Again and again, from the 
civic to the sexual, courts, contracts, and individuals 
presume consent; beyond that, importantly, individuals in 
lower positions of power -- the citizen in the face of the 
state, women in relation to men, and children with adults - 
- must perform an extraordinary refusal of consent for it 
to register with society as such.
Even if we set aside the discursively produced legal 
notion that children cannot consent, and presume for a 
moment that they could, consent pre-exists as a condition 
of civil and sexual life in a democracy. Individuals may 
withdraw consent, still a differential in socially 
constructed power (male to female, adult to child) allows 
the dominant person to reduce or eliminate a subordinate's 
access to that withdrawal. Children with adults, like all 
individuals in subordinate positions of power, have limited 
access to withdrawal of consent, if they have any access.
17
The Male Victim of Sexual Violence
When I was a child
I caught a fleeting glimpse, 
Out of the corner of my eye.
I turned to look but it was gone.
I cannot put my finger on it now, 
The child is grown, the dream is gone.
- Roger Waters, Comfortably Numb
Rich lays out power differentials as a material 
condition of life as a woman: "[cojercion and compulsion 
are among the conditions in which women have learned to 
recognize our strength" (228) and suggests that "women are 
all, in different ways and to different degrees...victims" 
(237) of female sexual slavery'. As I have previously 
stated, heteronormativity easily inscribes "female victim" 
— Rich addresses her call to action against the ease with 
which it is deployed. There need not be any adjective 
placed ahead of female victim to know that "victimizer" 
equals male.
In that foreword, written three years after 
"Compulsory Heterosexuality," Rich states about her article 
that "there is nothing about such a critique [of the 
institution of heterosexuality] that requires us to think 
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of ourselves as...totally powerless" (228) and that the 
article was written to "encourage heterosexual feminists to 
examine heterosexuality...and to change it" (227). According 
to Rich, power is absent but available to women; the 
presence of available power for women simultaneously 
inscribes its available absence for men. The deconstructive 
twists to find this absence outline its invisibility.
The male victim of sexual violence is produced only 
when a male victimizes another male, relying upon the 
heteronormative power of penetration to provide the 
mechanism by which the nonconsensual receptive male is 
constructed as a victim. All male victims are subsequently 
coded "gay." However, the question has to be asked: can 
there be coercion without a gendered male victimizer?
In this rigid construction of male/masculine 
female/feminine, nonconsensual female sexual violence seems 
impossible and is certainly invisible. Male victim exists 
only when a male dominates (penetrates) another male. Only 
in being dominated (penetrated) and thus identified with 
the feminine does the male become a victim. In Rich's notes 
for "Compulsory Heterosexuality," in which the author 
offers an extensive bibliography of texts on incest, none 
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of the titles acknowledges anything but male on female 
incest. Male victim does not exist.
In order for a male victim of female sexual violence 
to exist within the construct of a heteronormative society, 
a passively constructed male would have to exist 
simultaneously with the production of an active (read 
"penetrating") gendered female. This "impossible" 
manifestation of male femininity (and its consequent, male 
victim of female sexual violence) within heteronormative 
construction may be instructive for understanding its 
necessary absence.
The incoherence/absence of the construction "male 
victim of female sexual violence" does not indicate its 
actual absence. If anything, the erasure calls into 
question the disruptive power of such an event. I am left 
with only with a question: if there exists "a political 
imperative to use the necessary errors or category 
mistakes" of "'gay' and 'lesbian'" (Butler 309), does the 





Butler, Anzaldua, and the Abject Being
Judith Butler's work has considered the theoretical 
limits of gender, sex, and the material body. In it, Butler 
uses the idea of "performativity" to denote the discursive 
nature of gender (and sex) that exists through repetition 
and reiteration of norms and that, in spite of the 
materiality of the body, connotes gender and sex as a 
performance, albeit one whose roles are always already 
constrained. Butler asserts "that identity is 
performatively constituted by the very 'expressions' that 
are said to be its results" (qtd in Jagose 84). Further, 
she suggests that social construction, far from offering an 
ability to choose subjectivity, might better be understood 
in inextricable relation to the "natural," which also must 
be refigured away from that which "is 'before' 
intelligibility, in need of the mark, if not the mar, of 
the social to signify, to be known, to acquire value" 
(Bodies 4-5). Butler states "it would be a mistake to 
associate 'constructivism' with 'the freedom of a subject 
to form her/his sexuality as s/he pleases'" (Psychic 94).
21
Discussing representations of gender in another piece, 
Butler writes that "[t]he 'being' of the subject is no more 
self-identical than the 'being' of any gender; in fact, 
coherent gender, achieved through an apparent repetition of 
the same, produces as its effect the illusion of a prior 
and volitional subject" ("Imitation" 314). Butler tempers 
this (nearly essentialist) view of construction with the 
idea that "[tjhe denial of the priority of the subject, 
however, is not the denial of the subject (315); still, the 
subject in question is heavily constrained within the 
demands of a heteronormative culture.
This frame of reference for the discursive production 
of identity (sexuality and gender) serves as a significant 
premise of my project: understanding "the recasting of the 
matter of bodies as the effect of the dynamic of power" 
(Bodies 2). In other words, bodies cannot choose not to be 
influenced by a heteronormative culture.
Butler also asserts that "'[sjex' not only functions 
as a norm, but is part of the regulatory practice that 
produces the bodies it governs" (1). She writes that the 
"exclusionary matrix" of this normative practice
requires the simultaneous production of...those who 
are not yet 'subjects,' but who form the 
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constitutive outside of the domain of the 
subject. ...[And t]his zone of uninhabitability ... 
will constitute that site of dreaded 
identification. In this sense, then, the subject 
is constituted through the force of exclusion and 
abjection (3).
Some subjects are formed, then, by exclusion; that 
exclusion depends, at least in part, upon the "the abiding 
repudiation of some sexual possibilities" (Butler, Psychic 
94). The abject being is relegated to the "'unlivable' and 
'uninhabitable' zones of social life which are nevertheless 
densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of 
the subject, but whose living under the sign of the 
'unlivable' is required to circumscribe the domain of the 
subject" (Bodies 3).
It seems reasonable to ask if these exclusions include 
the "primary prohibitions" of adult/child sex and incest; 
if they do, does it matter within compulsory 
heterosexuality whether the body in question is "subject" 
(agent) or "subject to" (victim)? In other words, from this 
perspective, are not both the perpetrator and the victim of 
an act of sexual violence constituted as Butlerian abject 
beings?
23
If the "subject to" position, which might be called 
"subjection," can be construed as abject, its relation to 
the source of subjection (culture) is significant. This 
passage from Butler's The Psychic Life of Power examines 
how power and identity work within the subject:
We are used to thinking of power as what presses 
on the subject from the outside, as what 
subordinates, sets underneath, and relegates to a 
lower order. This is surely a fair description of 
what power does. But if, following Foucault, we 
understand power as forming the subject as well, 
as providing the very condition of its existence 
and the trajectory of its desire, then power is 
not simply what we oppose but also, in a strong 
sense, what we depend on for our existence and 
what we harbor and preserve in the beings we are. 
(2)
This sort of psychic attachment to the power that oppresses 
accounts for both the agency that can relieve the 
oppression and the always already state of the regulation 
that forbids it. There exists a duality of sorts, a subject 
whose agency is in question, whose subjectivity exists and 
does not. As Butler notes, "[t]he form this power takes is 
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relentlessly marked by a figure of turning, a turning back 
upon oneself or even a turning on oneself. This figure 
operates as part of the explanation of how a subject is 
produced, and so there is no,subject, strictly speaking, 
that makes this turn" (3). The non-volitional, turning 
subject, never glimpsing itself, whose gender and sexuality 
are performatively constituted in the "mime ... already 
underway" (Butler, "Imitation" 314), is the absent figure, 
the male victim.
Gloria Anzaldua's hybrid work Borderlands/ La 
Frontera: The New Mestiza refigures the idea of Borderlands 
and how the inhabitants of Borderlands are viewed and view 
themselves. This cross of theory and experience lays out 
the topography of specific bodies (or even more 
specifically, Anzaldua's body) existing in the liminal 
space of the Mexico/U.S. border. As she describes 
(embodies) her specific erased, subordinated existence, she 
(paradoxically) delineates a subjectivity that extends 
beyond her. This body, her body — simultaneously between 
and within normatively exclusive subject positions — has 
important implications for other bodies whose self 
(subjectivity) does not cohere with Western cultural 
heteronormativity. This "borderlands" correlates to
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Butler's abject being. Anzaldua's transgression offers the 
possibility of existing with and disavowing the abject, as 
Anzaldua locates herself within the dissonance.
Anzaldua distinguishes '"borderlands" and
"Borderlands." The proper noun (Borderlands) indicates the 
area of northeast Mexico, ceded to the U.S. in 1848 in the 
Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo, in which Anzaldua's mestiza 
consciousness takes root. The common noun (borderlands) 
indicates the psychological, spiritual, and sexual 
borderlands that "are not particular to the Southwest" 
(Borderlands 19). As Anzaldua asserts, "[a] borderland is a 
vague and undetermined place created by the emotional 
residue of an unnatural boundary" and those who live there 
are "in short, those who cross over, pass over, or go 
through the confines of the 'normal.'" These "prohibited 
and forbidden ... inhabitants" are not simply those who are 
illegal, they are "the squint-eyed, the perverse, the 
queer, the troublesome" (25). More than just a place, a 
borderlands is a social construction; here, identity is 
formed less by who people are than by who they are not 
(heterosexual, European, white, etc).
As Anzaldua theorizes Chicana identity, she explicitly 
leaves room for other interpretations of borderlands.
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Anzaldua brings into relief the duality between allegiance 
to and rejection of multiple subject positions. The 
Foucaultian subject is formed from without and via the 
self-regulatory practice that is an effect of the social 
construction; Anzaldua's subject also stakes out a peculiar 
reflexive site -- a moment of recognition and dislocation 
of self. The importance of this Butlerian turn is that 
Anzaldua chooses to remain in that state of dislocation, 
and to explore the inability to reconcile the image and the 
necessary lack of totality of the "I."
The moment Anzaldua "claims" any sign, she 
simultaneously produces that which "remains permanently 
concealed by the very linguistic act that offers up the 
promise of a transparent revelation" (Butler, "Imitation" 
309). That act of concealment multiplies and overlaps 
categories of ethnicity, sexuality, and gender. According 
to Anzaldua,
The ambivalence from the clash of voices results 
in mental and emotional states of perplexity ... 
[c]radled in one culture, sandwiched between two 
cultures, straddling all three cultures and their 
value systems, la mestiza undergoes a struggle of 
flesh, a struggle of borders, an inner war. The 
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coming together of two self-consistent but 
habitually incompatible frames of reference 
causes un choque, a cultural collision. 
(Borderlands 100)
Anzaldua's cultural choque denotes the crash of "habitually 
incompatible" cultural constructions on (in between) 
proximate physical spaces and lands, yet she deploys 
phrases that suggest that, in the same choque, identity 
categories scrape against each other as well (e.g., "clash 
of voices," "mental and emotional perplexity").
Male victim may not experience the physical, cultural 
aspect of this choque. I contend, however, that a male 
victim occupies a similarly impossible space. Anzaldua's 
subject is not a "simple". In this multiple otherness, the 
body in question both exists within the frame and without, 
however it is constructed. Similarly, if metaphorically, 
the ostensibly charmed male butts up against the 
"habitually incompatible frame of reference," the abject 
being "male victim." The subject is within and without 
simultaneously. "The struggle is inner ... our psyches 
resemble the bordertowns and are populated by the same 
people" (109). Anzaldua's concept of the problems of 
identity categories, then, might be said to consist of the 
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friction, the marks left by the places where the 
constructed "cubbyholes stuffed respectively with 
intellect, race, class, vocation, [and] gender" ("To(o)" 
267) scrape past one another. Can we break apart normative 
heterosexuality's cubbyholes, exclusions, and erasures?
Within compulsory heterosexuality, incest and 
adult/child sexuality are among the primary prohibitions, 
the excluded sexual possibilities. Butler makes this point 
about the conditions under which child sexual abuse occurs:
[O]ne reason why debates about the reality of 
sexual abuse of children tend to mistake the 
character of the exploitation [is this; i]t is 
not simply that a sexuality is unilaterally 
imposed by the adult, nor that a sexuality is 
unilaterally fantasized by the child, but that 
the child's love, a love that is necessary for 
its existence, is exploited and a passionate 
attachment abused. (Butler, Psychic 7-8)
Whether or not Butler refers specifically to female on male 
sexual abuse, but she certainly acknowledges the abusive 
nature of any such adult/child interaction. As I have 
previously shown, sexual abuse is only coherent in the form 
of male (predator) on female (prey). Compulsory 
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heterosexuality can produce the active male subject 
position, but not an active female; and it can produce the 
subject position of female victim, but the male victim, due 
to the absence of the coded active female, can be produced 
only by a male agent. In a case of a female-to-male 
incestuous or adult/child sex act with an active (predator) 
female, the dissonance created by the conflicting norms of 
gender coding and primary prohibitions would be drowned out 
by the sound of the march to heterosexuality that recasts 
the act as having been desired by the victim.
The male victim of female sexuality is abject in 
heteronormative culture. Absent or excluded or incoherent, 
the experience has no voice. To get any sense of the 
experience, we must look to other voices speaking about 
other abject experiences. Kathleen Barry, writing about 
female sexual slavery, suggests that "[ujntil we name the 
practice, give conceptual definition to it, illustrate its 
life over time and in space, those who are its most obvious 
victims will also not be able to name it or define their 
experience" (qtd in Rich 236). Butler also reminds us what 
it means to be invisible: "[t]o be prohibited explicitly is 
to occupy a discursive site from which something like a 
reverse-discourse can be articulated; to be implicitly
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prohibited is not even to qualify as an object of 
prohibition ... It is one thing to be erased from discourse, 
and yet another to be present within discourse as an 
abiding falsehood" (Butler, "Imitation" 312).
Compulsory heterosexuality constructs possible 
identities and codes for gender and sexuality and 
simultaneously erases, excludes, renders impossible (throws 
off the possibility of) others. Butler has shown that these 
identity categories and codes are so pervasive as to 
provide the conditions under which a subject can be formed. 
When the gender coding of masculine male — as "not 
victim," as the only code for active sexuality active, and 
as the code for supremacy that contains within it the 
illegitimacy of disavowing that supremacy -- 
clashes/coexists with the sexual impossibility of the 
subject position "male victim of female sexual abuse," 
mutually exclusive subjects are formed; a body that exists 
across, between, but contained in neither identities is 
inscribed.
Anzaldua may provide "male victim" with an analog to 
disavow and simultaneously exist within/across the 
dissonance of abjection and normative heterosexuality.
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CHAPTER THREE
DISCURSIVE SUBJECTION IN REPRESENTATIONS OF 
FEMALE-ON-MALE CHILDHOOD SEXUAL ABUSE
In films like All That Jazz (1979), Murmur of the
Heart (1971), Summer of '42 (1971), Harold and Maude
(1971), and Tea and Sympathy (1956), sexual acts between 
adult woman and minor boys "are seen as healthy gateways to 
manhood" (Gartner N. Pag.). Discussing his film Murmur of 
the Heart, Louis Malle said, "Maybe it's better to make a 
film about making love with your mother than dreaming about 
it all your life" (DeBruge 38). Heteronormative society, 
reflected in these films, routinely constructs the act of a 
woman having sex with a boy, even incest, as a rite of 
passage.
Critical reaction to these films has reinforced the 
normative value of these representations. Critics from The 
New York Times, The London Daily Telegraph, and others have 
described Murmur of the Heart as "delicate" (Kakutani Bl) 
and "poignant" (Monahan 12). Posts at online communities 
like "The Internet Movie Database" and "NetFlix" 
participate in the discursively constructed notion that 
these portrayals are simply coming-of-age stories.
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Compulsory Heterosexuality in
Murmur of the Heart
That director Louis Malle's 1971 film Murmur of the 
Heart was (and continues to be) popular and well-received 
is not in question. The film is generally considered to be 
a powerful coming-of-age story. It received an Academy 
Award nomination for best original screenplay and was 
nominated for the Palme d'Or at the Cannes Film Festival.
•If the film represents a coming-of-age, then examining 
the etymology and usage of "coming-of age" may be 
productive for the discussion of normative practices. I 
suggest that the denotation and connotation of the term 
"coming-of-age" demonstrate its normative qualities.
The term "coming-of-age" denotes the age at which a 
child legally becomes responsible for his or her actions. 
The usage of the term out of that literal context creates 
something different: a new moment or process that it 
presumes to describe; the usage then imposes that moment 
onto speculative subjects. It relies upon the denotation to 
infer that in order to fall within the laws of the culture, 
everyone must "come of age." This is not simple aging, 
however; this is a cultural (un)marking. Speculative 
subjects arrive at a point at which they must perform a 
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ritual set of behaviors, the enactment of which unmarks 
them and allows them acceptance into the normative culture. 
Failure to do so must result in the formation of a 
Butlerian abject being, relegated to that "'unlivable' and 
'uninhabitable' zones of social life" (Bodies 3). Indeed, 
as I will suggest, the film demonstrates the demarcation of 
these livable and unlivable zones and the force that 
compulsory heterosexuality must exert on speculative 
subjects to adhere to the norm. Coming-of-age, then, is 
simply one part of the "work... which the whole of society 
pursues on each individual through innumerable mechanisms 
of discipline" (Foucault "Discipline" 1643). And in this 
film, coming-of-age is represented as the successful 
completion of the heterosexual act of coitus.
The stakes are high. Achieving heterosexuality serves 
the normative societal function to "transform the sexual 
conduct of couples into a concerted economic and political 
behavior" (Foucault "History" 1653) and this imperative is 
clear in the upper middle-class family portrayed in the 
film. The church, school, family structure, and all the 
various "mechanisms of discipline" will be brought to bear.
In this film, Laurent, the 14-year-old protagonist, 
does not appear to struggle with who he is; he is
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intellectual, sensitive, clumsy, and likes jazz music.
Still something is not right. These traits stand in 
contrast to those of his brothers, who have been expelled 
from school, drink and carouse and generally perform the 
part of healthy young male heterosexual. In the absence of 
the qualities of maleness that his brothers possess, the 
film asserts a deficiency present in Laurent. He is not 
adhering to the norm; he must have a problem. His brothers, 
his father, his school friends, a representative of the 
church and others attack the problem in a series of events 
that train him in the norms of male heterosexuality. 
Ultimately, though, Laurent's failure to successfully 
perform the heterosexual act of coitus that will constitute 
him as a male heterosexual requires an intervention by his 
mother, who rescues Laurent's faltering heterosexuality by 
sleeping with him. The necessity of the performance of the 
part of heterosexuality is so important that the mother is 
willing to violate the taboo of incest to get her son to 
adhere to the norm.
I will look at' a few specific scenes from the film 
that demonstrate Butler's notion of performativity. The 
film offers several examples of the "set of acts within a 
highly rigid regulatory frame that congeal over time to 
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produce the appearance of...a natural sort of being" (qtd in 
Jagose 84. That the performances — and the cultural 
narratives they invoke (of gender, of sex, of deviance) -- 
appear so naturally within the film underscores their 
normative power. The representation of these acts echo 
societal expectations, which in turn reinforces the 
representation, and the circle of discursive production is 
complete.
Early in the film, Laurent's brothers enter his room. 
The middle brother Marc, dressed in full drag — hat, 
heels, necklace and all — starts to coo mockingly at 
Laurent. As the brothers close in on Laurent, they undress 
him and comment that he is "pink and sweet good to eat" 
(Murmur). In a deconstructive way, the blur of the line of 
gender represented by Marc in drag is an enforcement of 
that line, while Marc's taunt of Laurent stands in for the 
derision of the object of imitation — their mother.
Later in the scene, the boys notice that Laurent has 
an erection. One could wonder if Laurent's erection means 
he is attracted to the image of a man in drag, but the boys 
redirect the homo-erotic display into a comparison of penis 
size. With this act the brothers are performing a "ritual 
reiterated under and through constraint, under and through 
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the force of prohibition" (Butler Bodies 95) which in 
effect reconstitutes the heterosexuality of the scene. 
Indeed, when the housekeeper enters the room at the end of 
the scene, the older boys continue their performance, at 
one point pushing her over and imitating a sexual assault; 
older woman, for her part, simply laughs. She knows that 
this performance is intended to produce healthy 
heterosexuality, which exists peaceful along a continuum 
with rape, but not with homosexuality. Eve Kosofsky's 
Sedgwick's radically disrupted homosocial continuum (2433) 
is in full force here, as the boys' performances cross the 
ritual (constructed) boundaries of heterosexual/homosexual 
and normal/deviant in order to show those boundaries and to 
indicate exactly what is prescribed and what is prohibited.
Representation of the performance of actual homosexual 
in Murmur of the Heart serves only to demonstrate the 
"threat of ostracism" (Butler 95) present in it. When 
Laurent is called from class to attend mandatory 
confession, the boys yell at him to "watch his butt" 
(Murmur) with the priest. In confession, the priest follows 
the dictum that Foucault outlined: "sex must not be named 
imprudently, but its aspects, its correlations, and its 
effects must be pursued down to their slenderest 
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ramifications" ("History" 1649). He asks Laurent to be very 
specific about his thoughts and actions, and despite (or 
because of) the fact that Laurent confesses to masturbating 
many times, including twice with his brother Marc, the 
focus remains on the (implied) perversions of the priest. 
Laurent's behaviors do not yet constitute a performance 
outside of Butler's domain of the subject.
The priest then stops the confession to talk to
Laurent "as a friend, not a confessor" (Murmur) and 
proceeds to warn him of the danger of behaving outside the 
norm. The priest earnestly tells Laurent that "we are all 
weak" and that "for those who vow chastity, it's a 
struggle, believe me" as he touches the boy's shoulder. By 
the time he cautions Laurent to "think of your future wife" 
and to "watch out" not to "form habits that" will be 
"impossible to break" (Murmur), we see an example of 
Foucault's panopticon. The priest has internalized the 
prohibition against homosexuality. He is now the confessor 
and his confession is a cautionary one -- do not turn out 
like me. The priest is speaking as an abject being. He is 
demonstrating the constitutive outside of the domain of the 
subject in order to delineate that domain for the young 
Laurent.
38
Back in the classroom, one of the boys in the class 
draws and passes around a particularly graphic note, in 
which the priest — misshapen, dressed in collar and cross 
but nude from the waist down — fiendishly holds a naked 
woman by the hair. The equation homosexual equals deviant 
is complete. The priest is the picture of Foucault's 
invented homosexual who is "a type of life, a life form, 
and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a 
mysterious physiology" ("History" 1663). That the priest 
barely reacts to the drawing is another iteration of self­
regulation; he recognizes his own "species" (1663).
The culturally normative view of lesbians is also 
presented in a scene in which two 16 year-old girlfriends 
are dancing together. Laurent's friend Hubert announces, in 
a classic proclamation of the heterosexual imperative, that 
the girls are lesbians. Laurent later asserts the same 
thing to his mother -- ostensibly because his advances 
toward one of the girls were rebuffed -- the audience is 
cued that Laurent has made some progress toward conformity 
to the patriarchy. He has acquired homophobia.
Still, the boy is not a man. Despite the "proximities" 
and "insistent observation[,]" the "exchange of discourses, 
through questions that exhorted admissions, and confidences 
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that went beyond the questions that were asked" (Foucault 
"History" 1663), Laurent is angry, frustrated and mean. The 
film appears to trace the source of Laurent's dismay to a 
particular moment in the film. Early in the film, Laurent's 
older brothers drunkenly break into the room where he is in 
the middle of having sex with a prostitute they have paid 
for. This concept of the male virgin being constituted into 
a man by a prostitute is a familiar performance of the 
introduction to heterosexuality, and it is reverentially 
portrayed, until the boys barge in and literally pull 
Laurent off the woman. In a quick cut to the next day, the 
brothers apologize — something they will not do throughout 
the rest of the film, even after other more criminal 
behavior, such as the theft and sale of family heirlooms or 
forgery of a priceless work of art. In their behavior with 
Laurent and the prostitute, the brothers realize that they 
have a sense that they have interfered with the necessary 
production of a’norm; their interference represents a 
rupture of the "highly rigid regulatory frame" (Butler qtd. 
in Jagose 84) that is required for Laurent to come of age.
A remarkable scene at the end of the movie represents 
what is at stake if Laurent does not come of age and make 
it to normative heterosexuality. While wearing his mother's 
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bathrobe, Laurent carefully lays out selected pieces of his 
mother's clothing on the bed: bra, panties, garter, 
stockings, dress, and pearls. He dresses in her clothing 
and in the bathroom mirror, while he applies mascara and 
makeup, he recites words he overheard his mother and her 
lover exchange. He repeats them again and again. He seems 
at ease in this performance, but the absence of his concern 
is the concern. It is "the departure from the norm, the 
anomaly...that haunt [s] the school, the court, the asylum or 
the prison" (Foucault "Discipline" 1641) and it is this 
that should haunt Laurent, as it haunts the priest. If he 
repeats this behavior, he becomes the pervert, and 
constitutes himself as deviant.
Finally, though, Laurent's mother and he go to a 
Bastille Day celebration. She gets drunk and he escorts her 
home. She unceremoniously kisses him, then again and again 
and the scene ends. The absence of the representation of 
the performance of the sex act is the iteration of its 
presence, and it asserts the normativity of the 
performance; it does not even need to be shown. As Foucault 
observes: "There is no binary division to be made between 
what one says and what one does not say; we must try to 
determine the different ways of not saying such things, how 
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those who can and those who cannot speak of them are 
distributed, which type of discourse is authorized, or 
which form of discretion is required in either case" 
("History" 1654).
At the beginning of the next scene, the "ways of not 
saying things" (1654), the distribution of authorized 
discourses, along with the forms of discretion are outlined 
to Laurent by his mother. She tells him that they will 
remember this as a "beautiful and solemn moment that will 
never happen again" (Murmur). There is no need for it to 
happen again; the performance of the sexual act has 
constituted his identity as heterosexual. The mother can 
indeed remember the event "without remorse, tenderly" 
(Murmur); the continuity of the systems of power "make it 
possible to...legitimize disciplinary power, which thus 
avoids any element of excess or abuse it may entail" 
(Foucault "Discipline" 1643). The mother's actions, however 
abusive, are disciplinary and excused by the exigency of 
the norm.
The results of the performance become readily 
apparent. Laurent gets out of the bed, his mother still 
asleep, and goes off down the hall as the bells ring 4 AM. 
He knocks on the door of one of the young girls in the same 
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hotel, and when she opens the door, grabs her and starts to 
fondle her. When she protests, he simply asks where her 
friend's room is. The rituals that his brothers performed 
for him are now available to Laurent. He has internalized 
the system. He is normal.
When Laurent makes his way back to the room he shares 
with his mother, his father and brothers are there, eating 
breakfast. His father seems angry with him; his father has 
been angry with him the whole film. The father sternly asks 
Laurent where he has been; Laurent's crumpled clothes and 
tousled hair tell where he has been. Without a word from 
Laurent, one by one the entire family breaks into laughter. 
Everything is all right now that everyone knows Laurent is 
unmarked; he has come of age.
Malle's statement that "it's better to make a film 
about making love with your mother than dreaming about it 
all your life" (DeBruge 38) bears repeating. It should be 
shocking, however, in its heteronormative context, it is 
quaint, almost funny. That Malle could confess such a 
"perversion" attests to the power of the norm of 
heterosexuality to privilege those who are constituted as 
its subject. Malle can lay claim to such a position at 
least in part because of the representation of the
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heterosexual norm in the film. He is one of "those who 
can...speak" (Foucault "History" 1654), and the force of that 
subjectivity is not easily shaken loose, even by a stated 
desire to have sex with his mother. That desire simply 
restates the Freudian norm that it, in turn, supports.
Murmur of the Heart represents the exigent enforcement 
of the heterosexual norm; the successful performance of 
heterosexual sex outweighs the taboo of incest. Foucault 
suggests that "the type of power...brought to bear on the 
body and sex...had neither the form of law, nor the effects 
of the taboo" and that "it did not set up a barrier; it 
provided places of maximum saturation" (1665); if this is 
true, then Louis Malle's Murmur of the Heart is one of 
those areas of saturation.
Other Perspectives
Critics at the time of the release and since have 
hailed Murmur of the Heart; critical response to the film 
appears to validate the normative value of the 
representations in the film and within European and 
/American culture. Critics of the film, when they consider 
the representation of the act of incest (which many do 
not), find various ways to interpret the act in socially 
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acceptable terms. I believe this refiguring occurs, in 
part, as critics attempt to reconcile the cognitive 
dissonance between the culturally constructed primary 
prohibition of incest and the positive representation of 
Laurent at the end of the film. Additionally, though, 
critics' reinterpretation enacts the impossibility of the 
subject position "male victim of female sexual abuse."4 
Critics do not question the mother's deployment of power 
over her child; in some cases, authors cite it (in the form 
of love or caring) as the motive for the act.
Mary Hamer, in her book Incest: A New Perspective, 
suggests that incest enacts an abuse of power not unlike 
that which occurs in hierarchical' structures such as 
education and religion. She also maintains "scepticism 
about the use of incest as a bugbear" (53), and suggests 
that the persistent notion that incest may not always be 
wrong leads her to question "what is causing the breakdown 
in love" (3).
While much of Hamer's point of view is consistent with 
my premise, her consideration of Murmur of the Heart falls 
short in several aspects. First, of the six works she 
considers, Murmur of the Heart alone represents female-on- 
male incest. Unfortunately, Hamer also offers only Murmur 
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of the Heart as an example of a work that successfully 
defuses the negative aspects associated with incest. She 
suggests that the movie offers "no place for trauma, or for 
catastrophic transgression" (52). I contend that the abject 
being "male victim of female sexual abuse" cannot cohere 
with catastrophe; if the "subject" does not exist, there is 
no locus for pain. Finally, Hamer recites the 
heteronormative line when she suggests that the mother 
"continues to see her job in terms of protecting the life 
that is in her son" so that his "wish both for closeness 
and independence" will not become "a predatory force when 
it is systematically and repeatedly thwarted, as in the 
figure of the celibate priest" (53). This version 
reinforces compulsory heterosexuality's demands that the 
mother intervene so that Laurent can become a ratified 
subj ect.
If Hamer sets out to radically reconsider abuse as an 
exercise of control and power, here she misses an important 
opportunity to extend that understanding to include boys. 
She does not fail to perceive abuse in all contexts; Hamer 
has no trouble demonstrating the exercise of power present 
in other, more conventional representations, such as 
Nabokov's Lolita. She claims that "[f]ar from being a story 
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of love ... Lolita tells of a mounting violence" (143) and 
that although Lolita dies in childbirth, "[i]t is as a 
child she died to herself much earlier" (149). Hamer only 
struggles to see past the norm of male victimizer/female 
victim, past the oedipal scenario.
In addition to simply failing to perceive any boy as a 
victim (or any mother as a victimizer), Hamer may have been 
influenced by what Philippe Carrard calls the redondance 3 
in the film; Carrard extends Susan Suleiman's view of 
redondance to suggest that Malle creates an "acceptable" 
incest by controlling aspects of the cultural narratives 
presented in the film in order to allow only one reading.
Carrard suggests that Malle deploys, among other 
things, time and location (the act of incest takes place at 
a spa far from the home on Bastille Day) to control 
available points of view. By creating an irresistible 
overwhelming atmosphere of carnaval, Malle can reasonably 
suspend the prohibition of incest.
Carrard marvels at the "almost perfect consensus" that 
the film "is a masterpiece of taste and sensitivity" (693), 
and challenges that view without addressing it directly. He 
suggests that male dominant orthodoxy haunts the film, and 
that the heteronormative fantasy of older woman-younger boy 
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sex clouds the likelihood of trauma represented in the 
film. Carrard does not make any claim about the existence 
(or lack) of trauma in the film; he focuses on the 
availability of cultural constructions that makes a 
"positive" incest plausible.
In an overview of Malle's early films, Hugo Frey 
dismisses concern for the act of incest in Murmur of the 
Heart by suggesting that the "episode" is simply "ironic" 
(32), a claim he neither substantiates nor for which I can 
find much evidence. Many critics gloss the incest in this 
way; this acknowledges — through silence -- that further 
investigation presents a larger problem than the critic 
cares to undertake.
Perhaps the most telling account of how Murmur of the 
Heart represents compulsory heterosexuality's fantasies 
comes from a brief interview with Oscar-nominated American 
film director Wes Anderson. Anderson speaks the cultural 
narrative that others only suggest:
The stuff between him and the mother feels more 
kind of romantic almost -- but also taboo and 
scary in a way, which makes it even more 
seductive ... You know it's not traumatic -- it
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ends up being an expression of how close they 
are, and how connected they are. (Monahan 12) 
To Anderson, sex is "stuff," and the boy that Anderson 
envisions possesses the independence and strength to 
understand that — the boy is just an extension of 
Anderson. Anderson's fantasy, like Malle's, represents the 
desire of a man looking backward at childhood, not that of 
the child in the experience. Anderson's words, like 
Malle's, have validity because they come from a subject 
previously constituted outside the domain of the abject. 
Unfortunately, no one has yet spoken adequately, or so 
loudly, to the abject being's disjuncture between reality 
and fantasy.
One theorist disembodies the notion of child abuse so 
completely that his revisionist assertions almost nullify 
the concept of abuse. James Kincaid's Erotic Innocence 
asserts that the myth of childhood innocence has 
infiltrated cultural narratives surrounding child abuse. 
Loosely following Foucault's assertions about sexuality, 
Kincaid suggests that a contemporaneous "fabrication of the 
modern child" (52) essentialized childhood as a "biological 
category" (53). Imbued with a variety of conflicting 
qualities, this new entity's negative sexuality -- the 
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innocent absence of sexuality that invokes sexuality by its 
absence -- continues to both allure and repel adults.
According to Kincaid, this duality of allure and recoil has 
given ri.se to narratives of abuse. He deploys the 
presumption that narratives are, by nature, contingent 
reconstructions that should not be mistaken for truth.
I doubt that Kincaid intends to trivialize all 
narratives of abuse, yet he caricatures, many of those 
narratives: narratives of false/recovered/implanted memory; 
of false accusation; of childhood sexual innocence; 
including the backlash and counterbacklash. His tone 
throughout the piece conveys his derision. For example, 
Kincaid inserts a Gilbert and Sullivan chorus to mock Alan 
Dershowitz's The Abuse Excuse (270); in another passage, he 
refers to a therapist and patient as Tweedledee and 
Tweedledum. Mocking the subject of his exploration detracts 
from the serious intent of his project.
Kincaid asserts that "we [have] eroticiz [ed] ...empty 
innocence" (17) and that this somehow implicates children 
in the deployment of power over them that the eroticization 
creates, whether children possess actual innocence or not. 
He fails to consider that the ready availability of consent 
(the persistent difficulty of withholding consent) -- along 
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with exercises of power present in the enactment of abuse - 
provide the opportunity for abuse more than imagined 
innocence ever could.
Kincaid ultimately suffers most, though, from a lack 
of consistency. When it suits his purpose, narratives seem 
to emerge from a conveyor belt of cultural production; 
agency is hidden and suspect. Some are "myths-on-wheels 
that, despite the backlash and vigorous refutation, keep 
rolling along" (81), others "are simply there, plain and 
simple" (4). When it suits Kincaid differently, individuals 
deploy and control cultural narratives; in fact, Kincaid 
suggests that we "try our hand at a new story-telling" 
(280) in order to create a new world, in which abuse 
ostensibly ceases to exist because we no longer tell 
stories about it. He does not account for how narratives of 
actual abuse might figure onto this positive outlook. In my 
view, agency exists somewhere in the middle ground; it 
deploys more nimbly than a monolith yet resists isolated 
attempts at change.
Agency
The theoretical and embodied existence of available 
identities (subject positions) presents a paradox of 
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agency. Who possesses the agency to radically redistribute 
control of available identities sifted by race, by gender, 
by sexual object choice, or by adherence to a norm? The 
discursive production of norms occurs in such a way that it 
appears "natural" to most; to others, charmed bodies 
sinisterly (or at least unconsciously) control the 
production. Still others note that agency moves within in a 
movable blend of societal production and individual 
performance. Whether norms can change quickly or remain 
relatively constant, the production of those norms is 
reflected, recreated, and reinforced in the performances of 
individual within and without identity.
Judith Butler, by reconsidering the body, offers a 
guide:
None of us can truly answer to the demand to "get 
over yourself!" The demand to overcome radically 
the constitutive restraints by which cultural 
viability is achieved would be its own form of 
violence. But when that very viability is itself 
the consequence of a repudiation, a 
subordination, or an exploitative relation, the 
negotiation becomes increasingly complex.... 
Doubtlessly crucial is the ability to wield the 
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signs of subordinated identity in a public domain 
that constitutes its own homophobic and racist 
hegemonies through the erasure or domestication 
of culturally or politically constituted 
identities. ... [However,] every insistence on 
identity must at some point lead to a taking 
stock of the constitutive exclusions that 
reconsolidate hegemonic power differentials, 
exclusions that each articulation was forced to 
make in order to proceed. (Bodies 118)
The attempt to bring abject beings into a livable zone 
requires a reflexive, modulated claim to identity that 
periodically asks those constructed in that identity to 
work against its necessarily limiting scope. For bodies 
constructed at once within, in between, and outside various 
identity positions, the question may simply be: how do I 
know who I am?
53
NOTES
1 W. Holmes and G. Slap's "Sexual Abuse of Boys: 
Definition, Prevalence, Correlates, Sequelae, and 
Management" (JAMA 280 [1998]: 1855-1862) offers statistical 
information about the effects of sexual abuse on boys.
2 David Halperin's analogy between food choice and 
sexual object choice suggests that prohibiting certain 
practices does not make sense. It may further be 
interpreted to reinforce the legitimacy of the notion of 
"child as sexual object choice". His observation is apropos 
and lacks only a consideration of consent; vegetarians 
would argue that meat-eating is wrong precisely because it 
lacks consent.
3 Literally translated, redondance means 'redundancy;' 
Carrard uses it to mean a "surplus of information that 
compensates for loss due to other points of view and 
assures the preservation of the message" (695).
4 Some of the authors disclaim their position with 
regard to child abuse: Hamer admits she has no "personal 
experience of incest or sexual abuse" (2); and Kincaid 
writes that "this talk of 'stories' does not mean that I 
regard child molesting as unreal" (3). The authors may be 
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responding proactively to expected normative emotional 
response to their theoretical positions; but I suggest that 
these disclaimers may also represent one of the practical 
limits of theory: it lacks force when it does not reflect 
the specific experiences of specific bodies.
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